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Abstract
There exist marked differences in the educational attainment of immigrants, depending on both the level and
distribution of income in the country of origin and destination. This paper estimates an education-specific gravity
equation for migration between European countries. Given the lack of data on migration flows by level of education,
these are proxied by the difference in resident migrants by nationality and level of education, between the years
2000 and 1990. I find that highly educated individuals are more likely to migrate. They are less sensitive to
geographical and cultural distance as barriers to migration, but are not unambiguously more responsive to wage
differentials. Controlling for education-specific wage differences between origin and destination removes only part
of the observed differences in migration behaviour between education groups.
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Abstract
There exist marked differences in the educational attainment of immigrants, depending on
both the level and distribution of income in the country of origin and destination. This paper
estimates an education-specific gravity equation for migration between European countries.
Given the lack of data on migration flows by level of education, these are proxied by the
difference in resident migrants by nationality and level of education, between the years
2000 and 1990. I find that highly educated individuals are more likely to migrate. They are
less sensitive to geographical and cultural distance as barriers to migration, but are not un-
ambiguously more responsive to wage differentials. Controlling for education-specific wage
differences between origin and destination removes only part of the observed differences in
migration behaviour between education groups.
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1. Introduction
This paper considers differences in migration behaviour between individuals with different
levels of education, for the case of migration between developed countries. We use a
gravity equation for migration based on a discrete choice framework, and approximate
migration flows using data on the stock of migrants in EU15 member states, plus Iceland
and Norway. This selection of countries is based on data availability, and the aim to estimate
migration flows between countries where migration has been free over the period considered
(1990-2000).1
People with a higher level of education have been observed to be more likely to migrate
between US states (Molloy et al., 2011), and between EU regions (Mauro and Spilimbergo,
1999), even when controlling for a variety of characteristics, such as age, marital status
or home ownership. An important question is whether educated people face different
circumstances (for example, higher wage differentials between origin and destination), or
whether this different behaviour even exists when controlling for these circumstances, and
are due to, for example, residual differences in `taste' for migration which correlate with the
level of education. A simple example would be the case of log-linear utility, which would
imply that (abstracting from migration costs) if the income difference between two regions
is identical for low and highly educated individuals, this would imply a larger difference in
utility terms for people with a lower level of education, due to the concavity of the utility
function. Another example would be the presence of fixed costs of migration in case of
linear utility, which would mean that individuals with high wages would be more prone to
migrate given a certain relative wage differential, as for them, the fixed costs of migration
would be smaller compared to the potential income gain. There may be numerous other
considerations, such as financial constraints and capital market imperfections, which would
imply that individuals with low incomes migrate less than expected even in the face of large
interregional wage differentials.
To avoid imposing restrictions regarding the functional form of the effect of wages and
wage differentials, I start with an exploratory data analysis, using semi-parametric methods
to unveil the relation between wage differentials and migration. I subsequently impose
more restrictions on the data in order to obtain a migration equation which is as general as
possible, but simultaneously sufficiently succinct to allow to state and test clear hypothesis
about differences between education groups regarding their migration behaviour. The
obtained empirical results will be used to introduce differences in the migration behaviour
by education level in the regional CGE model Rhomolo (Mercenier et al., 2016).
2. Data
There exists no comprehensive dataset on migration flows between EU member states.
Although the EU micro-level Labour Force Survey is extensive, it is unsuited for analysing
migration. As argued by Martí and Ródenas (2007), the only question asked in the LFS which
in theory could be used to determine historical migration movements, asks all individuals
about their residence exactly one year before the date of the interview. This is problematic
for at least two reasons. First, in most countries the panel is rotating. Individuals being
interviewed for the second year will therefore be found to be internationally immobile simply
because of the sampling design. Second, in most countries sampling is based on population
registries. The longer it takes between arriving in the country of destination, and before a
migrant enters into the registry, is sampled, and finally interviewed, the less the respondents
will appear to be internationally mobile. Realistically, there might be a gap of at least several
months between arriving and being interviewed. Moreover, as both the exact procedures for
registration and the LFS sampling method differ significanlty between countries, so will the
magnitude of the resulting bias. These issues render the question about the whereabouts of
the respondent one year before the interview useless for analysing international migration
flows.
The EU statistical office Eurostat used to report administrative data on international
and interregional (within-country) migration flows for a selection of member states, but
has stopped to do so and has removed these datasets from its publicly available database.
1The countries we consider are the major EEC and EFTA members in 1990, between which there existed free
movement of workers and/or people, to various degrees, but especially so from 1992/1993 onwards with the
establishment of the EU and EEA. Our data on the number of residents with a foreign nationality stems from
Docquier et al. (2007).
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Although this administrative data would be a quite precise source to analyse regular migration
(and was used in Brandsma et al., 2014, for example), it lacks information on the educational
background information, and therefore is unsuitable for this study.
Unfortunately, there exists no data on bilateral flows by level of education. Therefore,
to approximately calculate the migration flows between member states by education level,
I have to resort to taking the difference in the stocks of migrants by nationality, between
the years 2000 and 1990, as reported by Docquier et al. (2007). Although it might be
the only route to obtain approximate migration flows by education level, the approach is
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it attributes all changes in stocks of migrants by
nationality to migration, ignoring other demographic factors, such as mortality and fertility.
This is problematic in the context of studying differences in migration behaviour between
educational groups, since these demographic factors (and the bias in the estimation of
migration flows) may differ significantly between them. It is reasonable to assume, for
example, that the average age of the individuals with the lowest level of education is
significantly higher compared to those with medium or high levels. If this is the case,
changes in stocks of migrants with low levels of education may rather reflect higher mortality
rates in this group, or issues such as return-migration, or naturalisation (when migrants
obtain the nationality of the host country) which we will ignore in this study. Also from a
behavioural point of view, when considering migration as an investment decision, it is to be
expected that, ceteris paribus, older subgroups are less prone to migrate.
Table 1 shows the stock of immigrants by nationality in the years 2000 and 1990, for the
subset of EEA countries contained in the dataset of Docquier et al. (2007). I chose the EEA
as the relevant set of countries, as these are all countries between which there has been
long-standing agreements assuring the free movement of labour. Switzerland was excluded
since it agreed to free movement of labour from EU countries only in the year 1999. In
some countries, the number of residents with a specific nationality decreased over time,
sometimes considerably so. I will ignore these observations.
3. Methodology
To derive an estimable migration equation relating the aggregate inter-regional migration
flows to behavioural parameters I use the approach described in Brandsma et al. (2014),
and start from the individual migration decision. Indices for the level of education are left
out for now. Consider an individual k from origin region o, maximising indirect utility, Vkor,
across all possible destinations r. Destination d will be chosen if
Vkod > Vkor ∀ r
Vkod = Zodβ + ξod + ekod.
The indirect utility Vkod of worker k migrating from origin region o to destination region
d is determined by characteristics, Zod, of regions o and d. The vector β contains the
slope parameters and the vector product Zodβ represents the utility the individual receives
from the characteristics contained in the vector Zod. The scalar error term, ξod, represents
unobserved location and origin-destination-pair characteristics. Zodβ and ξod assign the
same utility level to all individuals considering migration from o and to d. The idiosyncratic
error term ekod varies across both individuals and regions. It accounts for the fact that not
all individuals from the same origin region choose the same destination. The probability that
location d is chosen as a destination by a resident k of region o, Pr (Mkod = 1), then equals
Pr (Mkod = 1) = Pr (Vkod > Vkor) ∀ d 6= r
Pr (Mkod = 1) = Pr (ekod − ekor > Zorβ − Zodβ + ξor − ξod) ∀ d 6= r.
Now assume that the idiosyncratic error term ekod follows an iid extreme value distribution.
McFadden (1973) shows this yields the following probability for a worker k to migrate from
o to d:
Pr (Mkod = 1) =
exp (Zodβ + ξod)∑R
d=1 exp (Zodβ + ξod)
. (1)
Berry (1994) in turn shows that probability (1) of migrating from o to d can be interpreted
as the share of workers from o migrating to d. Following Sorensen et al. (2007), we therefore
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Table 1: The change in the number of resident migrants (stock), between 1990 and 2000, by
nationality (rows) and country of residence (columns). There is no data for the UK as a country of
residence. Source: Docquier et al. (2007)
4
write the share of migrants from o to d as:
sod = Pr (Mkod = 1) =
exp (Zodβ + ξod)∑R
d=1 exp (Zodβ + ξod)
, (2)
and the share of stayers in region o as:
soo = Pr (Mkoo = 1) =
exp (Zooβ + ξoo)∑R
d=1 exp (Zodβ + ξod)
. (3)
Dividing equation (2) by (3) and applying a logarithmic transformation yields a simple
estimable migration equation:
ln

sod
soo

= ln

exp (Zodβ + ξod)
exp (Zooβ + ξoo)

= Zodβ − Zooβ + ξod − ξoo. (4)
In this paper, I do not consider nested choices as in Brandsma et al. (2014), as the
origin-destination pairs are countries and have no clear nesting structure. The assumption
of independence of irrelevant alternatives is therefore more likely to hold than in the case of
regions nested in countries, which was considered in Brandsma et al. (2014).
4. The relationship between income differences andmigration
flows: exploratory analysis
This section considers the relationship between the income difference between two locations
and the historic migration flow (as proxied by the difference in stocks) between them, by
means of semi-parametric methods. These methods impose a standard rigid parametric
structure on a subset of variables in the migration equation, while allowing the data to
freely determine the shape of the relationship for some other variables. The econometric
estimation equation derives directly from Eq. (4), but distinguishes between education
levels e ∈ {Lo,Med,H}:
ln

sode
sooe

= β0 + βdistlndistod + βclangclangod + βcbordcbordod
+
∑
r∈{o,d}
βpopr lnpopr + β
tourism
r tourismr + β
lnpli
r lnplir
+m(wagede − wageoe) + ξ′od
(5)
where m() is a non-parametric function to be estimated. The variables considered are the
geographic distance between the capitals (lndist), and two proxies for cultural distance: a
dummy indicating a common language between origin and destination (clang), and a dummy
indicating a common border (cbord). Furthermore, we include the population in origin
and destination as a measure of size (lnpop); the number of overnight stays by tourists,
per capita, in origin and destination, as a proxy of amenities such as climate (tourism);
and the purchasing power price index to control for the cost of living (lnpli). Finally, we
consider the average wage by education group (wagee,r). By considering education-specific
wages, rather than the economy-wide average wage, the analysis adresses some of the
selection issues which are inherent in migration, albeit quite partially. Migrants are likely a
non-random sample from the underlying population, for which the average wage in origin
and destination is not the relevant reference wage.
Table 2 shows the results for the parametric part of the estimation. The specification in
column (I) corresponds to equation 5 and includes m(ged,e−geo,e) nonparametrically.
Column (II) rather uses m(ged,e) for the nonparametric part, and estimates a slope
parameter for geo,e. The specification in column (III) considers the reverse: including
m(geo,e) nonparametrically and including a linear effect for ged,e. For comparison,
column (IV) is a traditionally specification, fully parametric, including linear effects for all
variables. Summarising the effects of the parameter estimates over all specification, we
find the expected effects on the variables proxying distance (also for common language and
border which proxy cultural distance). The size variables (lnpop) have the expected sign, as
do the variables proxying amenities (tourismr). The price indexes also have the expected
sign and are significant.
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(I) (II) (III) (IV)
logdistod −0.877∗∗∗ −0.646∗∗∗ −0.589∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗
(−5.05) (−4.09) (−3.84) (−4.06)
clangod 0.487 0.448 0.403 0.461+
(1.26) (1.27) (1.19) (1.42)
cborderod 1.016∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗
(3.43) (3.89) (4.14) (4.68)
lnpopo −0.386∗∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗ −0.431∗∗∗ −0.415∗∗∗
(−5.90) (−5.36) (−7.52) (−6.25)
lnpopd 0.725∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(10.88) (12.36) (7.50) (11.64)
tourismo −0.159∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(−3.75) (−2.59) (−4.38) (−4.76)
tourismd 0.145∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(3.87) (4.68) (2.20) (5.98)
lnplid −2.075∗∗ −3.617∗∗∗ −3.196∗∗∗ −3.841∗∗∗
(−2.53) (−4.68) (−3.30) (−4.89)
lnplio 1.118+ −0.717 −0.797 −0.700
(1.46) (−0.83) (−1.12) (−0.96)
wagede 0.185∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(7.07) (7.93)
wageoe −0.0361+ −0.0392+
(−1.47) (−1.64)
_cons 9.130+
(1.48)
N 416 416 416 416
adj. R2 0.526 0.568 0.476 0.580
t statistics in parentheses+ p < 0.2, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: A semiparametric gravity equation for migration: esimates of the slope parameters. Col-
umn (I) includes m(ged,e − geo,e) nonparametrically. Column (II) uses m(ged,e) and
estimates a slope parameter for geo,e, and vice-versa in column (III). Column (IV) is fully para-
metric, including linear effects for all variables. Figure 1 shows the corresponding estimated nonpa-
rameteric part.
For the three estimates corresponding to the columns (I) to (III) of Table 2, Figure 1
shows the remaining variation in migration with the parametric part partialled out, overlaid
with the estimated non-parametric function m(). The left panel corresponds to equation
Eq. (5), where the difference in wages m(waged − wageo) enters nonparametrically. There
is a clear upward slope: controlling for a large set of covariates, there is a clear positive
relation between the wage difference between destination and origin, and migration. This
effect seems broadly linear. The middle panel of the figure considers a specification with
m(waged) as the nonlinear part, and includes wageo linearly. Again there is a clear positive
relationship, which seems approximately linear. The right panel considers a nonlinear effect
for the wage in the country of origin, through specifying m(wageo). Here, the slope is
negative, but quite flat. The effect seems stronger for the lowest values of wageo.
Visual inspection of the graphs reported in Figure 1 suggest the effect of wages on
migration in equation 5 is approximately linear. Comparing the specification reported in
column (IV) of table 2 with an alternative with wages entering in logarithms resulted in an
adjusted R2 of 0.567, which suggests a significantly worse fit as compared to the purely
linear model with an R2 of 0.58.
It is important to note that this exploratory analysis has ignored any differences between
education groups regarding the effect of the explanatory variables on migration: although
we consider wages which are specific to each education group, the slope parameters are
identical across education groups. One possible explanation for the apparent weak relation
between the origin-wage and migration (right panel of figure 1) therefore could be that
there are underlying significantly different effects (slopes) for separate education groups.
6
DK
NO
DK
DKNO
NO
DK
NO
DKNO
LULU
DE
IS
UK
DK
NODEUKLU
DK
IE
IE
DEIE
NO
DK
DK
SENOBE
IE
DK
BE
IT
DK
IS
LU
DK
NO
BE
SE
DK
NO
IT
BEIS
UK
FR
NL
DE
NO
LU
IE
DE
AT
LU
DE
IE
UK
DK
UK
UK
I
SE
NO
DK
AT
NLBE
DK
NL
UK
DK
BE
FR
NO
DE
IT
NO
LU
AT
SE
FI
AT
IS
UK
NO
NO
IE
FIFR
IS
I
SE
DK
IE
UK
FI
IE
DK
FR
NO
NO
LU
FR
DE
IS
SE
IS
LU
LU
T
IS
SE
IE
B
AT
IS
DEIE
LU
BE
IS
LU
UK
DE
FI
IS
LU
I
DE
I
FI
SE
IS
IT
IS
EL
BE
UK
BE
IS
IT
E
IS
AT
D
I
FI
BE
FR
DE
IS
FR
DE
EL
DK
UK
UK
NL
I
IS
FI
BE
FRNL
IE
IE
AT
UK
UK
IE
SEIE
FR
IE
FR
UKFI
SE
SE
NL
FRPT
NLSE
IE
AT
NL
BE
BE
IT
BE
NLUK
IT
IS
UK
BE
FI
FR
NL
LU
FR
IS
I
FI
FIE
BEAT
FRIS
IS
UK
FR
I
IT
EL
E
FI
AT
UK
UK
BE
UK
IT
BE
FRFI
BE
SER
IS
DE
I
IS
FR
EL
IT
UK
FR
NL
LU
FI
DE
NL
SE
LU
IT
DE
AT
FR
UK
UK
NL
ELAT
UKNLFI
UK
FR
NLNL
DE
ES
ATAT
FI
FR
BEELATN
FR
IS
UK
IT
NL
EL
IT
SE
AT
AT
ES
FR
PT
NL
IT
PT
AT
NL
AAT
IT
IT
UK
FI
AT
FIAT
SE
FI
FI
SE
FR
NL
BE
NL
PT
IS
IT
ES
EL
ATFIATSE
PT
ES
EL
E
ITIT
ES
S
ES
IS
PT
AT
FI
LU
FR
ELELL
FR
E
LUDE
PTL
FIESSE
AT
ES
DE
FR
EL
SEEL
PT
PT
PT
NL
FI
PT
SE
NL
EL
EL
PT
FI
ES
NL
EL
NL
ES
NL
PT
IT
PT
PTES
PT
NL
PT
PT
FI
SE
IT
PT
ES
ELEL
PT
EL
PT
EL
ES
PTPT
EL
ESPT
EL
PT
ES PT
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
bl
a3
-20 -10 0 10 20
wagedif
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PTT
PT
PT
PT
PT
ES
ES
ESES
ES
ES
ES
ES
ESESES
ES
ES
ES
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
IT
IT
II
IT
ITI
IT
I
III
I UK
UK
UK
DE
DE
DE
DE
FR
FR
FR
IT
ITI
IT
IT
IT
II
IT
IT
I
IT
I
ES
S
ES
ES
ES
ESES
ESES
ATAT
AT
AT
AT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
FII
FIFI
FI
FI
FI
I
FI
I
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
ISIS
IS
I
FI
FIFI
FII
IFIIFI
FIFI
I
FI
FI
UK
UKUK
BE
BE
BE
BEBE
BE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SESE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
I
IE
II
IE
BE
BE
BE
BE
BE
BE
IE
IEIE
IEIE
IE
I
I
IE
IE
IE
IE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
LU
LULU
LU
LU
LU
SE
SE
FI
FI
FI
FII
I
FI
FI
FI
FIFI
I
IS
IS
IS
I
IS
ISIS
IS
IS
IS
I
FR
FR
FR
FRFR
AT
ATAT
AT
AT
AT
T
NO
NONO
NO
NO
DK
DK
DK
DK IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
ISISBEBE
BE
BE
BE
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
I
ITI
IT
I
ITI NO
NO
NO
NO
NONO
IE
IE
IE
I
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
DK
DKK
UK
UKUKDE
DE
DE
DE
DE
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
NO
NO
NO
NO
DK
DK
DK
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
bl
a3
5 10 15 20 25
wageto
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
PT
ELEL
ELEL
L
EL
EL
EL
EL
EL
L
EL
L
EL
EL
ES
ES
ES
ESES
ES
ES
ATATAT
AT
AT
AT
I
IT
IT
I
IT
I
IT
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
EL
EL
EL
EL
EL
EL
EL
UK
UK
UK
UKUK
UK
DEDE
DE
DE
DE
FR
FRFR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
IT
IT
IT
IT
IT
ITIT
S
ES
S
ES
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
AT
PT
PT
PTPT
PT
PT
PT
PT
FI
FI
FI
FI
FI
FINL
NL
NL
NL
NL
NL
L
LU
LU
LU
LU
L
LU
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
IS
ISI
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
II
I
I
I
I
I
FI
FI
I
UK
UK
UKK
UK
UKUK
BE
BE
BE
BE
BE
BEBE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SESE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
IE
IEI
I
I
I
BE
BE
BE
BE
BEBEBE
IE
IE
IE
IEIE
IEDE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
DE
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SESE
SE
FI
FI
FIFI
FII
FI
FI
FI
ISIS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
FR
AT
ATATAT
AT
AT
AT
NLNLL
NLNL
NL
NL
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
DKDK
DK
DK
DK
DK
ISIS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
IS
BE
BE
BE
BE
BEBEIT
IT
IT
IT
ITI
ITIT
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
I
IE
DK
DK
DK
DK
DK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
DE
DE
DE
DEDE
DE
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
LU
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
DK
DK
DKDK
DK
DK
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
bl
a3
5 10 15 20 25
wagefrom
bandwidth = .8
Lowess smoother
Figure 1: The estimated non-parametric functionm(), for three specifications of the semiparametric
kernel regression Eq. (5). Dependent variable: ln(sode /sooe ). The left panel plots m(ged,e −
geo,e). The middle panel corresponds to a specification withm(ged,e) and includes geo,e
linearly in the parametric part. The right panel shows m(geo,e) en includes ged,e linearly.
Differentiating the effects per education group will be the topic of the next section.
5. Differentiating by level of education
5.1 Differentiating by level of education: Econometric analysis
The limited number of observations implies that we cannot hope to distinguish separate
effects on all variables for all education groups. I therefore chose to restrict a common effect
between education groups for a large subset of variables, while allowing only differences
between education groups regarding the effect of wages in both origin and destination, and
the effect of the contiguity dummy, as a proxy for cultural distance. The three variables
proxying for migration costs: geographic distance, and the common language and the
contiguity dummies, are too highly correlated to separately estimate while distinguishing
between education groups. Given that the exploratory analysis suggests that the effect of
income differences is approximately linear, I start by considering only linear effects when
considering differences between education groups.
Table 3 shows the results. The first column shows a specification without education-
specific variables (such as wages in origin and destination), but allows for a separate level
effect per education group. The specification includes a constant, and leaves out the effect
for the lowest level of education. The coefficients on the dummies for Medium and High
levels of education (I(Med) and I(Hi) respectively) therefore have to be interpreted as
expressing the difference of the level for these group relative to the base category of Low
education. The high and significant coefficients on the Medium and High education dummy
variable indicate that on average, controlling for the basic geography and distribution of
the population, the medium and high educated groups are overrepresented in the migrant
population, relative to the low educated. More specifically, ln(sode/ sooe) is estimated to be
0.75 higher for medium educated, compared to low educated. This implies that the ratio of
shares of migrants versus non-migrants is exp(0.75), or rougly 2 times higher. Given that
the share of stayers sooe is quite close to 1 for all education groups, across all origins, this
equates to an estimated double share of migrants in the medium educated group compared
to the low-educated. For the high-educated, this becomes exp(1.597) ≈ 5 times more.
These are quite considerable differences.
Column (II) in table 2 also allows for a different level effect depending on the education
group, but now controls for education specific wages in origin and destination as explanatory
factors of migration. The signs are as expected. Notably, when comparing to column (IV) in
table 2 which is equal apart from the absence of different level effects by education, the
effect of wages in the origin becomes stronger after including education-group-dummies.
Moreover, the results suggest that the higher tendency to migrate which is observed for the
highly educated, cannot be explained by the average wage differences between countries.
To the contrary, controlling for wages in origin and destination, the estimation results predict
predict higher shares of migrants among the medium and highly educated, as the estimated
level effects for these groups become larger. This is a perhaps suprising result, as it runs
counter to the intuition that higher average international wage differences (in absolute
numbers) for highly educated can explain the relative overrepresentation of this group
among the migrant population.
The specification in column (III) allows for differences in the overall level of migration
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Table 3: A gravity equation for migration, analysing the effect of education. Dependent variable:
ln(sode /sooe ). (I): level effect for education, no wages. (II): education-specific wages and level
effects for education. (III): allowing the effect of wages and the common border dummy (cborder)
to differ between education groups. (IV): wages in logs.
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depending on the level of education, as before, but additionally allows the effect of wages
(both in origin and destination) and the common border dummy (cborder) to differ by the
level of education. Again, low-education has been chosen as the base category, and the
results of the interaction variables have to be interpreted as differences relative to this
group. The reported effects of the variables reflect the values for the low-education group.
For example, considering column (III) and approximating the share of stayers sooe by 1, the
presence of a common border is expected to increase the share of low educated migrants
sodLo by ep(1.335) ≈ 3.8. This increase is predicted to be ep(1.335 − 0.197) ≈ 3.1
for the medium educated, and ep(1.335 − 0.742) ≈ 1.8 for the highly educated, but only
the latter difference (between high and low educated) is significant on the 5 percent level.
Considering countries at equal distances (which is the relevant case, since the specification
controls for geographic distance), I interpret the presence/absence of acommon border as
a proxy for cultural proximity/distance of both countries. The results suggest that these
factors matter less for more highly educated individuals.
The specification of column (IV) and (III) is identical, apart from the fact that wages now
enter log-linearly. Given the identical value of the adjusted R2-statistic, the quality of fit
turns out to be quite similar to the linear case. This may be due to the fact that for some
education groups, logs are the better fit compared to a linear specification, but the opposite
holds vice-versa for other education groups.
5.2 Differentiating by level of education: Discussion
What pertains from the econometric analysis in the previous section is that wages in the
origin are about equally important to the low and highly educated, but appear more important
to the medium educated. When considering relative differences in wages (specification
IV), there is some weak evidence that also highly educated value wage differences more
compared to the low educated, but not as much as the medium educated.
Regarding the wage in the destination, we find that it does not have a significant effect
on the low-educated, but more so (and about equally), for medium and highly educated. In
log-terms, the effect is significantly higher for the highly educated.
It is important to reflect on what may be the underlying cause of these effects. One
possible explanation for the lack of responsiveness of the lowest education levels to wage
differences, would be financial constraints: although local wages are low and wages abroad
are high, people lack the resources to migrate. As financial markets are imperfect, people
can not always borrow against a possible future income stream from migration, and therefore
the migration investment never takes place.
A more mundane explanation, however, lies with the limitations of using changes in
the stocks of foreign nationals between 2000 and 1990 to approximate migration, our
dependent variable in the econometric analysis. It is very likely that the group with the
lowest education levels also has a substantial higher average age (since the average level
of education has been steadily increasing over time). If this is the case, the low educated
individuals are also older, and less likely to migrate because of several reasons (it is well
established theoretically and empirically that migration is less likely beyond a certain age).
Apart from age, there are other covariates which one would like to control for as they might
affect migration decisions and are possibly correlated with the level of education, such as
home ownership. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate or control for these effect as we do not
have the required microeconomic background information.
Regarding the lower sensitivity of the highly educated to the wage in the region of origin,
when compared to medium educated, there are likewise a number of possible explanations.
A straightforward explanation would be concave utility: at higher levels of wages (and
higher educated have higher average wages), the marginal utility of income decreases,
and therefore the locally estimated slope of the linear relationship between local wages
and migration is lower for higher educated as compared to medium educated: for medium
educated, a 1 EUR decrease in the local wage represents a larger relative amount, compared
to the highly educated. But the lower effect for high-educated in response to changes in the
wages in the origin remains also when specifying wages in logs (specification IV).
Also interesting are the effect on the distance measures. Because these variables are
correlated, it is impossible to differentiate effect per education group for all of them. We
chose to report separate effects only for the common border dummy. The absence of a
common border (the effect of which is the opposite of the reported effect), has a smaller
negative effect on migration for the group of highly educated individuals.
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6. Conclusion
The analysis of migration by level of education within the EU is greatly hampered by the
lack of appropriate data. Considering the fact that migration flows are approximated by
considering changes in stocks of migrants, care has to be taken when drawing conclusions
from this study. Keeping this in mind, what pertains from the results, is that the effect
of wages on migration appears approximately linear. In the analysis which did not allow
for behavioural differences between education groups (table 2), the effect of the wage in
the destination seemed stronger compared to the effect of the wage in the origin. When
differentiating between education groups, individuals with low levels of education appear
quite insensitive to wage differentials in the possible destinations. They are much more
sensitive to local conditions, in contrast. When comparing across education groups, the
medium-educated individuals appear most sensitive to wage differences in the origin. But
more education always seems to imply a larger sensitivity to destination wages.
The results also suggest that language differences act as a hurdle to migration, although
language may well proxy other cultural factors which could cause individuals to prefer more
similar destinations, as compared to destination countries which are culturally more distant.
Sharing a common border also appears to increase migration flows between countries. For
the highly educated, having a common border matters significantly less for migration.
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